Almost every day, U.S. Central Command sends out an email listing Islamic State targets the U.S. and its coalition partners have hit in Syria and Iraq. The latest came Thursday, with two emails touting that a combination of U.S. bomber, fighter and remotely piloted aircraft conducted 11 airstrikes in Syria south of the Kurdish town of Kobani, three north of it and two in Iraq.
Since the unnamed air war began on Aug. 8, fighters, bombers, helicopters and drones have used more than 800 bombs and missiles to hit more than 320 targets in both countries, according to the MacDill Air Force Base-headquartered Centcom, which is commanding operations against Islamic State.
Islamic State’s ongoing offensive uniquely melds the terror tactics of a jihadi guerilla group and the open maneuver of a classic army thanks to its huge cache of tanks, artillery pieces and vehicles looted from the Iraqi military. But, despite the pending fall of Kobani and Islamic State pressure on other towns in Syria and Iraq, and the Pentagon’s pledge of support to Iraqi and Kurdish security forces, none of the airstrikes against Islamic State have yet been coordinated with indigenous forces on the ground, according to Centcom.
“Technically, none of the airstrikes conducted in Iraq and Syria would be considered Close Air Support (CAS),” said Army Maj. Curt Kellogg, a Centcom spokesman, in an email to The Tampa Tribune. “CAS is a specific mission that requires detailed integration of air support with the fire and movement of ground forces, specifically through direct communication between the ground force and aviation assets. While airstrikes in Iraq are in support of Iraqi Security Forces, coordination with the ISF for those strikes has been done through our Joint Operations Center, not direct communication between ISF units and strike aircraft.”
While combat veterans who either called in or relied upon airstrikes on the front lines in Iraq and Afghanistan say that’s blunting efforts against Islamic State, and that U.S. special operations forces on the ground offer the best chance for success, the Pentagon says the air campaign is meeting its goals.
“We believe they have been effective at what they are trying to achieve,” Rear Adm. John Kirby, the Pentagon’s spokesman, told reporters Wednesday. “And what we are trying to achieve from the air is two things. In Iraq, it’s to support Iraqi and Kurdish forces on the ground as they — and this is an important point — as they take the fight to ISIL on the ground inside their country. They are the ground forces that matter most in Iraq. And so much of what we’re doing inside Iraq from the air is helping them do that job, as well as to just routinely put pressure and try to set ISIL back on its heels a little bit more.”
The White House, and by extension, Pentagon, have maintained that the goal is to degrade and ultimately defeat Islamic State, not necessarily protect specific towns like Kobani.
“Airstrikes alone are not going to do this,” said Kirby. “They’re not going to fix this. They’re not going to save the town of Kobani. We know that. And we’ve been saying that over and over again. And yet we continue to get questions of, well, why aren’t you doing more? And how come they aren’t more effective? But what we’ve been very honest about, the limits of airpower here. And we don’t have a willing, capable, effective partner on the ground inside Syria right now. It’s just a fact. I can’t change that.”
The latest attacks on Islamic State destroyed a tank, two vehicles, support buildings, a heavy machine gun, a bunker, an ammunition cache, one small unit and damaged a fighting position, a training camp, two small units and one large unit.
But the continued Islamic State advance in both Syria and Iraq, including the fall last month of an Iraqi military base in Saqlawiya without any U.S. or allied air support, highlights long-standing concern that the lack of critical communications with ground forces is hindering the air campaign’s success.
“This thing that we call coercive airpower is effective up to a point,” said Robert Holmes, a retired Air Force brigadier general living in Tampa who in 2001 commanded Air Force special tactics forces calling in airstrikes in southern Afghanistan. “If you are not able to put the appropriate mass on the appropriate targets, it may have limited effect.”
While the air campaign is having some effect on Islamic State, it’s not a game changer, said Ben Connable, a retired Marine intelligence officer and former Middle East Foreign Area Officer now at the RAND Corp.
“All the capabilities we have are impressive, and they give us a real advantage over Islamic State forces,” said Connable, who served three tours in Iraq, retiring as a major in 2009. “But they are less effective, individually, rather than when applied collectively.”
Having overhead assets collecting intelligence is good, said Connable, “but they are less valuable than some guy on the ground who knows where the friendly and enemy forces are.”
And regardless of advanced technology, the region’s fickle weather still interferes with targeting, said Connable.
But there are bigger issues than merely the lack of close air support, he said.
The lack of trusted forces on the ground makes it harder to assess the effectiveness of the air campaign. And with the Iraqi security forces still on the run in some places and credible ground partners in Syria at least a year off, Connable said the biggest problem is not being able to take full advantage of the effects of massive airpower.
“You need credible people on the ground to do the hard work,” said Connable. “None of this matters unless you go into Kobani and seize terrain street by street and stay there, and have credibility with the population.”
Scott Neil, a retired Green Beret master sergeant now living in Tampa, voices the frustrations of many who served in Iraq and Afghanistan about the reticence to deploy commandos to increase the odds of success against Islamic State.
“Do special operators have the skills to go undetected in enemy territory and call in precision airstrikes against people and activities they know is of significant value?” asked Neil, one of the first troops into Afghanistan who also fought in Iraq and served on the Commander’s Advisory and Assistance Team in Afghanistan and as the Senior Enlisted Advisor to the U.S. Special Operation Command’s Interagency Task Force. “We don’t lack training and technology. Is it a lack of political commitment? A lack of desire to put soldiers in harm’s way? The assumption that bombing selected targets using surveillance and reconnaissance is an effective military measure when you have every expert telling you that what’s needed is not being done?”
When asked what advice he would offer to Army Gen. Lloyd Austin III, Centcom’s commander, retired brigadier general Holmes said he would pitch deploying special operations forces, which the military calls SOF.
“Lloyd Austin is doing a yeoman’s job,” said Holmes. “I know him very well and am embarrassed to offer him advice. But I would highly recommend the best military advice to go ahead and maximize the effect. You have got to be able to have your support forces on the ground. My advice would be if you can’t get that out of coalition or allied partners, it just substantiates the case of U.S. special operations forces. SOF needs to play.”
PHOTO: Smoke rises following an airstrike by U.S.-led coalition aircraft in Kobani, Syria, during fighting between Syrian Kurds and the militants of Islamic State group on Thursday. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS